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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE  
STATE OF IDAHO 
 
GENESIS GOLF BUILDERS, INC., 
formerly known as National Golf 
Builders, Inc., a Nevada 
corporation, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
PEND OREILLE BONNER DEVELOPMENT, 
LLC, a Nevada limited liability 
company; et al. 
 
     Defendants. 
____________________________________ 
 
VALIANT IDAHO, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
 
     Third Party Plaintiff-Cross 
Claimant-Respondent, 
v. 
 
JV L.L.C., an Idaho limited 
liability company,  
 
     Defendant-Third Party 
Plaintiff-Cross Defendant-
Appellant. 
__________________________________ 
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DOCKET NO. 44584-2016 
 
(Bonner County  
 Case CV-2009-1810) 
 
 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 
 
 
__________________________________________________ 
 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 
__________________________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner 
__________________________________________________ 
 
THE HONORABLE BARBARA BUCHANAN, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
__________________________________________________ 
 
John A. Finney 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
120 East Lake Street, Ste 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT JV 
Richard L. Stacey  
McConnell Wagner Sykes 
  & Stacey PLLC 
827 East Park Blvd, Ste 201 
Boise, ID 83712 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT VALIANT
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REBUTTAL ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
I. JV’S PLEADINGS, RESPONSES, AND MOTIONS RAISED THE TAX 
REDEMPTION SUBROGATION CLAIM, INCLUDING TITLE THEORY AND LIEN 
THEORY  
  
 
A. JV’s Pleading Raised Subrogation Under Title Theory Or 
Lien Theory 
 
On September 15, 2015, JV filed its JV L.L.L.’s [sic – 
L.L.C.’s] Special Appearance Contesting Jurisdiction; And JV 
L.L.C.’s Answer To Complaint; And JV L.L.C.’s Answer To Valiant 
Idaho, LLC’s Counterclaim, Cross-Claim And Third Party Complaint 
For Judicial Foreclosure; And JV L.L.C.’s Cross-Claim; And JV 
L.L.C.’s Third Party Complaint, which was verified by JV (herein 
“JV’s Claims Pleading”).  (R. Vol VII p 784-843).  JV 
specifically pled for relief based upon the tax redemption payment 
by JV to Bonner County and specifically asserted a first priority 
lien as to the property redeemed.  There are several provisions in 
JV’s Claims Pleading relevant to the issues on appeal. 
Paragraph 51 of JV’s Claims Pleading (R. Vol VII p 795-796), 
raised the Lien Theory, and provided as follows: 
51. JV L.L.C. admits paragraph 44, except denies that 
Valiant paid “to redeem the Idaho Club Property”, as Valiant 
paid only to redeem a portion of the Idaho Club Property 
real property.  JV, had previous in time to Valiant, paid 
Bonner County to redeem and did redeem a portion of the 
Idaho Club Property being a portion of the property referred 
to as Moose Mountain.  Valiant did not redeem from Bonner 
County, nor did Valiant pay real estate taxes on the Moose 
Mountain real estate that was redeemed by JV.  The tax 
parcels and real estate redeemed by JV are as stated in JV’s 
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Notice of Redemption, dated July 1, 2014, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as JV L.L.C.’s Exhibit D.  JV paid the 
Bonner County Tax Collector for the 2008 through 2014 real 
estate taxes pursuant to its redemption in the sum of 
$140,999.86, paid July 1, 2014.  JV L.L.C. claims the real 
estate tax redemption payment as the first priority lien as 
to the real estate redeemed by JV. 
Paragraph 63 of JV’s Claims Pleading (R. Vol VII p 797), 
raised the Title Theory, and provided as follows: 
 63. JV L.L.C. admits the dollar amount of payment by 
Valiant as alleged in paragraph 55; however JV denies the 
remainder as Valiant may not have been a party entitled to 
“redeem” and the stated payment was not “to redeem the Idaho 
Club Property” as JV had previously redeemed a portion of 
the Idaho Club Property.  JV has title to the property it 
redeemed as real estate pursuant to the recorded Tax 
Redemption Deed from Bonner County to JV on the redeemed 
Moose Mountain Property. 
Paragraph 74 of JV’s Claims Pleading (R. Vol VII p 798), 
provided as follows: 
 74. JV L.L.C. admits paragraph 66, except Valiant may 
not have been entitled to redeem and JV’s redemption is 
superior to Valiant. 
Paragraph 100 of JV’s Claims Pleading (R. Vol VII p 802-
803), made reference to the document attached thereto as Exhibit D 
JV’s Notice of Redemption, dated July 1, 2014.  The said Exhibit 
D. Notice of Redemption was attached (R. Vol VII p 827-828). 
Paragraph 108 of JV’s Claims Pleading (R. Vol VII p 805-806) 
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contains “JV L.L.C.’S Prayer for Relief”, and provided in 
subparagraph 5, as follows: 
 5. For Judgment in the amount of $140,999.86 
paid by JV to redeem from the Bonner County Tax Deed and for 
a first priority lien against the redeemed real estate. 
JV’s Claims Pleading raised the issues and claims of both 
the Title Theory and the Lien Theory. 
 
B. VALIANT’S Motion Sought Relief On The Lien Theory 
 
On January 20, 2015, VALIANT filed its Valiant Idaho, LLC’s 
Motion For Summary Judgment Against JV, L.L.C., North Idaho 
Resorts, LLC, and VP, Incorporated and its supporting pleadings 
(R. Vol XIV p 1720-1746).  In VALIANT’s Memorandum In Support Of 
Valiant Idaho, LLC’s Motion For Summary Judgment Against JV, 
L.L.C., North Idaho Resorts, LLC, and VP, Incorporated, filed 
January 20, 2015 (R. Vol XIV p 1725-1746) VALIANT argued that 
Idaho Code § 45-114 was applicable and that Idaho Code § 45-105 
was applicable.  VALIANT in part II. Statement of Facts, subparts 
A.5. and A.6. of its memorandum set forth its alleged facts 
regarding its July 7, 2014 redemption payment and the Redemption 
Deed issued in favor of VALIANT and argued that “Pursuant to the 
Seventh Cause of Action alleged in the Valiant Complaint, Valiant 
seeks to foreclose the Redemption Deed and for an adjudication 
that Valiant’s interest in the real property therein is superior 
and senior in right to any claimed interest in the real property 
by Claimants.”  (R. Vol XIV p 1731-1732).  Valiant in its part IV. 
Argument, subpart E. of its memorandum specifically set forth the 
provisions of Idaho Code § 45-114 and argued that the priority as 
 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF - 4 
to the amount paid for redemption for a tax deed was “at a 
minimum” that of the existing debts priority, and by that argument 
asserted that a greater priority based upon the subrogation 
statute Idaho Code § 45-114 to the tax lien and interest of Bonner 
County. (R. Vol XIV p 1742-1743). 
 
C.  JV’s Opposition To Summary Judgment Set Forth The Lien 
Theory and Title Theory 
 
On February 2, 2015, JV filed in opposition to VALIANT’s 
motion for summary judgment, its JV L.L.C.’s Memorandum In 
Opposition To Valiant Idaho, LLC’s Motion For Summary Judgment.  
(R. Vol XIX p 2076 – Vol XX p. 2322).  In that opposition, JV 
specifically argued for priority over Valiant Idaho based upon the 
tax redemption payment by JV to Bonner County.  JV set forth 
argument regarding the Notice of Redemption and the Redemption 
Deed (R. Vol XIX p 2099) and attached the Notice of Redemption as 
Exhibit L and the Redemption Deed as Exhibit M (R. Vol XX p 2301-
2307). 
 
D.  The District Court Identified The Redemption Deed 
Arguments Made By VALIANT 
 
The District Court, in its Memorandum Decision & Order 
Granting Valiant Idaho, LLC’s Motion For Summary Judgment Against 
JV, L.L.C., North Idaho Resorts, LLC, and VP, Incorporated, 
entered April 14, 2015, identified VALIANT’s argument that it not 
only relied upon being able to add the tax redemption payment to 
its debt, but that it “also” sought to foreclose pursuant to the 
tax redemption deed. (R. Vol XXII p 2566).  The District Court 
specifically ruled that “VALIANT’s Redemption Deed Has Priority 
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Over JV“ setting forth, but not analyzing, the provisions of 
Idaho Code § 45-113 (lienholder’s right to redeem), Idaho Code § 
45-114 (inferior lienholder’s right to redeem and right to be 
subrogated). 
 
E.  JV Sought Reconsideration Relief And Affirmative Motion 
For Subrogation Based Upon Title Theory And Lien Theory  
 
On July 30, 2015, JV filed its JV L.L.C.’s Motion To Alter, 
Amend, And Reconsider The Court’s Memorandum Decision And Order 
Re: JV L.L.C.’s Motions To Reconsider, And JV L.L.C.’s Motion For 
Partial Summary Judgment For Affirmative Relief Concerning JV 
L.L.C.’s Redemption Deed And As To Valiant’s Redemption Deed; And 
Request For Hearing. (R. Vol XXV p 2967-2980).  This motion by JV 
set forth the arguments brought forward on this appeal regarding 
JV being subrogated to the position of Bonner County by the 
redemption payment and the Redemption Deed, whether as owner by 
the failure of Valiant to subsequently redeem within 14 months 
(“Title Theory”) or by having the first priority encumbrance as to 
the amount paid in redemption (“Lien Theory”).  There is no need 
to fully reproduce the arguments in the motion in this brief, as 
the pleading is in the record on appeal, but JV highlights certain 
portions of the argument. 
JV argued that “1. Upon the Notice of Redemption, payment of 
$140,999.86 and by the Redemption Deed, JV became subrogated to 
the first (1st) lien position previously held by Bonner County for 
unpaid delinquent taxes under Tax Deed (Exhibit I):....” (R. Vol 
XXV p 2971-2972).  JV set forth the relevant statutory provisions 
of Idaho Code § 45-114 and argued that “Therefore, as part of JV’s 
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mortgage foreclosure, JV is entitled to enforce the tax redemption 
payment of $140,999.86, on the 5 tax parcels of JV’s Redemption 
Deed in the subrogated first lien position of the Bonner County 
tax lien.” (R. Vol XXV p 2973).  These arguments were in regards 
to the Lien Theory of the subrogated interest. 
JV further argued that “JV MAY HAVE RECEIVED TITLE BY ITS 
REDEMPTION DEED.”  (R. Vol XXV p 2974).  In the motion, JV argued 
that Valiant did not effectuate a subsequent redemption from JV 
during the 14 month statutory period.  These arguments were in 
regards to the Title Theory of the subrogated interest held by JV.  
JV set forth in its motion an “IN CONCLUSION” section 
summarizing the arguments that by its mortgage, its redemption 
payment, its redemption deed, and Valiant’s redemption deed (which 
did not include the property in JV’s redemption deed) that JV was 
subrogated to the first lien position of Bonner County as to the 5 
parcels described in the Redemption Deed.  (R. Vol XXV p 2978). 
JV sought affirmative relief by its motion, which was denied 
by the District Court, without any additional analysis or 
consideration of the statutory subrogation rights. 
 
F. JV Thoroughly Raised And Asserted Its Statutory Right 
Of Subrogation Under The Alternatives Of Title Theory 
And Lien Theory 
 
It cannot be said that JV failed to raise its claims for 
subrogation based upon payment of the tax redemption to the 
interest of the County.  JV pled, opposed summary judgment, and 
sought summary judgment on its statutory subrogation claim to the 
priority interests of the County tax lien and deed. 
Although both Valiant and JV raised the subrogation claims 
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pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-114, and although the District Court 
set forth the statute in its decisions, the District Court did not 
analyze or give effect to the subrogation rights pursuant to the 
statute to JV. 
 
G. JV Has A Statutory Right Of Subrogation And Merely 
Adding The Amount Paid To The Inferior Interest Does 
Not Afford Any Protection, Which Is Contrary To Statute 
(And Equity) 
 
While it is correct that the provisions of the various 
mortgages provide for the addition for the payment of taxes to the 
secured debt, and while Idaho Code § 45-105 does provide the 
statutory basis for the same result, that does not mean that a 
lender, in the event of several liens with varying priority, is 
not afforded the protection and benefit of Idaho Code § 45-114. 
The provision of Idaho Code § 45-105 provides for permissive, not 
mandatory or exclusive, relief.  Idaho Code § 45-105, which uses 
the term “may” rather than “shall” must be read in concert with 
Idaho Code §§ 45-113 and 45-114.  Idaho Code § 45-105 provides as 
follows: 
45-105.  SATISFACTION OF PRIOR LIEN. Where the holder of a 
special lien is compelled to satisfy a prior lien for his 
own protection, he may enforce payment of the amount so 
paid by him, as a part of the claim for which his own lien 
exists. 
 
Idaho Code §§ 45-113 and 45-114 (underline emphasis added) 
provide, as follows: 
45-113.  RIGHT TO REDEEM FROM LIEN. Every person, having 
an interest in property subject to a lien, has a right to 
redeem it from the lien, at any time after the claim is 
due, and before his right of redemption is foreclosed. 
 
45-114.  RIGHTS OF JUNIOR LIENOR. One who has a lien 
inferior to another, upon the same property, has a right: 
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1.  To redeem the property in the same manner as its 
owner might, from the superior lien; and, 
2.  To be subrogated to all the benefits of the 
superior lien, when necessary for the protection of his 
interests upon satisfying the claim secured thereby. 
 
These rights are in addition to merely adding the amount 
paid to the existing indebtedness with the existing priority.  
These rights to be subrogated are paramount when there are 
“junior lienors” and these rights protect the junior lienor that 
redeems with new money, and protects the new money by subrogation 
to the interest with the greater priority. 
Pursuant to subrogation, the junior lienor, here JV, is 
substituted into the place of the County, with either Title or a 
Priority Lien. 
The circumstances involving multiple lienors distinguishes 
the issues in this matter, and the subrogated rights of JV to the 
interest of Bonner County, from the facts of Hardy v. McGill, 137 
Idaho 280 (2002) and the case of Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 232 
(1952) cited by VALIANT.  Neither case involved facts where 
multiple lienors existed or where a junior lienor redeemed, and 
by statute is subrogated.  Those cases rejected the Title Theory 
in the circumstance where there was only a single lienor and in 
the circumstance where there was a dispute over the lien.  Those 
cases did not address the multiple lienholder situation and did 
not discuss the lien theory or the title theory based upon the 
statutory subordination provision. 
 
H. JV Is Not Limited By The Title 63 Redemption Statutes  
 
The provisions of Idaho Code § 63-1007 and § 63-1010 do not 
provide for a specific remedy limiting the rights of the junior 
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lienor who exercised the right to redeem and pays new money to a 
priority lienor to protect its junior interest.  Those statutes 
do not limit the applicability of Idaho Code §§ 45-113 and 45-
114, and are in the same title and chapter as the provisions of 
Idaho Code § 45-105 relied upon for the permissive right to add 
the payment to the existing encumbrance. 
Those provisions are silent as to the interest acquired by 
the redemptioner from the conveyance of the Redemption Deed 
issued from the County to the redemptioner (not issued to the 
prior owner or record).  The statutory provisions of Idaho Code § 
45-114 are the specific applicable statutes. 
 
II. JV Has A Subrogated Priority Interest 
 
In summary, the relief requested is for the subrogated 
interest of JV to be given effect by reversing the District 
Court’s findings and conclusion, and last entered judgment and 
last entered decree of foreclosure, and ordering one of the 
alternative reliefs sought, specifically either: 
1. Under the title theory that JV, by the Redemption 
Deed and the passing of 14 months, holds fee simple absolute 
title free and clear of any of the interests held by VALIANT 
(and any other claimants) in the real estate redeemed; or, 
2. Under the lien theory that JV holds the super first 
priority lien of the County for the amount of the taxes paid 
in redemption, and that JV is entitled to foreclose upon the 
same for the amount paid plus interest, with a first priority 
lien as compared to the interest acquired by VALIANT (and any 
other claimants) by the Sheriff’s foreclosure sale process on 
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the real property described in the Redemption Deed. 
 This relief effectuates the subrogated interests of JV to 
the County’s interest by the Tax Deed and Redemption Deed 
process.  This relief affords JV as an inferior lienor the 
protection provided for in the applicable statutes. 
 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COSTS AGAINST JV 
 
In the Appellant’s Brief, JV correctly set forth the total 
costs awarded to VALIANT of $41,479.69 and that the District 
Court’s arbitrarily allocated 37.5% against JV, which means that 
portion was not awarded against the secured debt enforced by the 
encumbrance upon the real property.  JV argued that all the costs 
of the foreclosure properly awarded should all be awarded against 
the indebtedness for foreclosure against the real property 
security. 
JV also addressed specific items, a portion of which were 
allocated against JV, by the District Court’s arbitrary in toto 
allocation rather than a cost by cost analysis and allocation. 
 In summary, the properly awardable costs of the foreclosure 
should all be allocated to and added to the secured indebtedness 
of POBD and not against JV.  The award against JV should be 
vacated.  If any amount is properly awardable against JV, most of 
the items sought should be disallowed as against JV. 
 
III. THE SANCTIONS AGAINST JV AND ATTORNEY GARY FINNEY SHOULD BE 
VACATED 
 
I.R.C.P. 11(c)(2) provides that a motion for sanctions “... 
must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be 
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presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, 
contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected 
within 21 days after service....”   This language conclusively 
provides for a 21 day period to allow a party against whom a rule 
11 violation is asserted, the opportunity to correct it.  The 
arguments for interpretation brought forward by VALIANT would 
totally remove the 21 day period from the rule. 
As to the assertion that Gary Finney “in his personal 
capacity” did not appeal, VALIANT recognizes the controlling 
precedence of Smith v. Treasure Valley Seed Co., LLC, 161 Idaho 
107 (2016) and its holding that an appeal signed by an attorney 
which identifies as an issue on appeal an award of sanctions 
against the attorney is sufficient.  There is no separate 
“personal capacity” in which the appeal must be pursued. 
At no time was JV and/or attorney Gary Finney given the 
opportunity to withdraw or appropriately correct the challenged 
filing within 21 days.  The sanctions should be vacated. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellant JV is entitled to relief vacating the Judgment 
and the Decree of Foreclosure and remanding for JV to be 
subrogated to the County’s tax deed interest under either the 
title theory or the lien theory.  JV is entitled to have the 
award of costs vacated and the costs disallowed.  JV and Gary 
Finney are entitled to have the imposition of sanctions vacated. 
 
 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _16 _ day of March, 2018. 
 
 
       _/s/__________________________  
       JOHN A. FINNEY 
       FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
       Attorney for Appellant JV 
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